In 2025, the prestigious journal „Behavioural and Brain Sciences” published a lead paper by Mark Moffett on the definition of “society”, followed by numerous comments by experts. This material is highly inspiring, but it also shows how limited cross-disciplinary exchange is, even when so many contributors join to discuss a definition that is a key concept in modern social science and biology. The inclusion of biology is central, since Moffett uses an expanded meaning of “society” that includes animal societies (excluding, apparently, plant societies, which is a major lacuna, since, given his expanded notion, a forest might count as a society). His definition is highly specific: “bounded groups beyond a simple, immediate family that have the potential to endure for generations, whose constituent individuals recognise one another as members, and that maintain control over a physical space.”
As the discussion on BBS shows, this definition is problematic but also widely accepted. I comment on it here because there is a huge gap in all contributions. This can be easily spotted when searching for “Tönnies” in the document, who only appears once in a marginal remark by Moffett. Nobody else mentions Tönnies, even though the definition clearly evokes the community-versus-society duality he introduced. This is not mere oblivion of intellectual history, since it reveals a much bigger gap that is significant in my thinking about the technosphere. The gap results from the extension of “society” beyond humans – but in which direction? I will argue that this extension is towards the parallel spiritual world of metapersons, as elucidated by Marshall Sahlins.
In Moffett’s paper and almost all comments, society is used inclusively to refer to the extension of non-human species. Tönnies, following other founders of the discipline of sociology (for example, Simmel), approaches “society” as a distinct form of modernity in the economic and cultural evolution of humanity: society is the life form of capitalism, understood as a distinct combination of expansive economic exchange, accumulation, and technological advancement. Clearly, in this understanding, non-human species cannot be societies.
Interestingly, Moffett’s definition shows traces of this understanding, as it seems to evoke a correlation between the modern nation-state and society, given his emphasis on territory. This is not what he intends, since he also has a biological notion of territoriality. But for humans, as society converges with the nation-state, cases like the Palestinians fit the requirement of belonging but lack a territory enshrined in statehood. So, is there a Palestinian society? People disagree in this debate.
The requirement of belonging is also problematic, as many commentators show, since it must rest on the notion of an imagined community, in a nutshell, or otherwise conflate with community in Tönnies’s sense (in Moffett’s definition, the “family” in a wider sense). In the discussion, two aspects loom large that Moffett explicitly relegates to a secondary position: first, the role of interaction and its specific functions; and second, the material forms of expressing and recognising belonging, i.e., membership in a society. The former is essential to Tönnies’s association between capitalism and society. The second is fundamental for understanding the role of media in linking the former to identity formation. For example, book printing was a crucial technology that was mobilised in economic exchange and thereby pushed the emergence of societies in Europe beyond communities.
We can conclude that society may be seen as the cultural form of the technosphere in humans, once we acknowledge that capitalism is the software by which the technosphere evolves. However, another distinct possibility remains. All commentators would certainly reject limiting the term to the social formations of Western modernity. I suggest another extension of the term that continues to treat humans as different from other species but also does not simply equate pre-modern human groups with communities. The solution of this quandary relates to the discussion of forms of belonging. Few authors engage more deeply in the role of spirituality in forming a society. I suggest following the reasoning of the late Marshall Sahlins: Human societies are built on the formation of metapersons in a spiritual world that parallels everyday human life. Society maps human action into that world, making society a virtual concept. This questions the role of territory, but metapersons can also define territorial boundaries through association with sacred spaces and places.
Such an expansion of Tönnies’s ideas would allow us to explore more deeply the interaction between the technosphere and the human life world: The technosphere is itself a world of emerging metapersons, certainly today in the form of AI, but also in the past once we recognise the agency emerging from assemblages of humans and artefacts. In this perspective, the use of tools marked the beginning of human society before the advent of modernity. After all, from early times onwards, tools were also shaped aesthetically, and archaeologists identify “cultures” by the diffusion of culturally marked artefacts by long-distance trade. Perhaps these traders were the earliest representatives of the emerging human life-form of society. For them, belonging was essential to sustaining trust in their trading communities, but their main activity was transcending community borders. This is salient to a deeper historical view of capitalism, which emerged much earlier than the 19th century; however, it was limited to certain societal circles in the territories where humans dwelled.
