Francis Fukuyama’s book “The End of History and the Last Man” is often naively viewed as a premature celebration of the historical victory of liberal democracy and capitalism over all alternative forms of political organisation in large-scale, globally connected societies. However, this interpretation reflects a serious misunderstanding of Fukuyama’s erudite work on global history. He takes Hegel seriously, particularly through the lens of Alexandre Kojève. Fukuyama argues that the ultimate struggle for recognition leads to the establishment of political regimes in which individual citizens are endowed with rights that enable them to pursue autonomously determined goals in life. In the afterword to the second edition of the book, Fukuyama provides some important clarifications. First, he asserts that recognition is strictly individualistic, as all forms of group recognition can undermine individual autonomy, and because group-based cultural frames can directly conflict with liberalism as a distinct cultural framework of its own standing. Second, he suggests that only civic identities on the national scale provide a fertile ground for the flourishing of liberal democracy. This latter point implies that liberal democracy cannot be attained on a global scale (this replicates Hegel’s critique of Kant), which is significant given that capitalism functions as a global economic system. Therefore, the economic forces of globalisation cannot be subject to a liberal democratic regime, reinforcing his argument throughout the book that there is no necessary relationship between capitalism and liberal democracy. From this, we might conclude that, given the growing social, cultural, and economic integration across countries, the “end of history” à la Fukuyama can only mean a “proof of principle,” but is still postponed until a global liberal democracy is achieved. As long as this is not the case, capitalism is compatible with various kinds of political systems, with China being the most controversial example today.
In this contribution, I aim to address these apparent tensions surrounding the concept of the “end of history.” Despite the lack of a necessary connection, Fukuyama links the rise of liberal democracy with the advancement of science and the globalisation of capitalism. His global history predominantly reflects the history of the Western world, as the struggle for recognition has gradually extended to regions that were subjected to Western colonialism and imperialism. In other words, global history tends to be Western-centered because both science and capitalism originated in the West. I would like to introduce two new ideas.
The general notion of universal progress is being questioned by many observers today, particularly in light of global warming and the collapse of biodiversity. While some view universal progress as a factor that has led to a planetary catastrophe, there are optimists who believe that science and politics can address these challenges. However, one fact remains indisputable: human history has reached its end, and we are now writing the history of our planet, or, in other words, geological and human history have become closely intertwined. This is a central idea in the concept of the Anthropocene, whether it is viewed as an “event” or an “epoch.” By definition, the Anthropocene refers to the way geological, or more accurately, planetary forces interact with human actions within the timeframe of human history. The term “Great Acceleration” denotes how human activities, even within geologically negligible time periods, can significantly alter geological forces (such as the melting of ice). Furthermore, these geological forces then reciprocally affect the human domain on a similar scale, even if their full impact ultimately unfolds over a much longer timeframe that exceeds human history. Since geological forces are central to human political and economic actions, we can rightly speak of the end of human history, but not the end of history itself. With the onset of the Anthropocene, humans have become an integral part of planetary history. We can speak of a “planetary longue durée” as a new view on the flow of events in the domain of human action, which mediates the timescales of human and geological history.
The second new idea is to examine Fukuyama’s argument in the context of truly global human history. While this concept is not entirely new, global history assumes a different significance when it is intertwined with the transition to planetary history. Let me illustrate this point using my own research on recent Japanese debates regarding postcapitalism. Japanese scholars have debated whether Japan is transitioning to a postcapitalist regime, one that is connected to its historical context prior to its encounter with Western powers and the subsequent race to catch up economically, politically, and militarily. In this view, the transition to capitalism in Japan may be perceived as a historical interlude lasting roughly three centuries, which could then be followed by a steady-state regime, akin to that proposed by John Stuart Mill. This would represent a creative reconstruction of critical cultural, economic, and social conditions of pre-capitalist Japan, albeit with modern technology and institutions.
These ideas confront three radically different views on global history (see figure).
One perspective adheres to the narrative of linear progress culminating in the “end of history.” In this view, all other local histories, such as the Japanese, are trajectories that eventually merge with a line of universal progress. In diagram A, the broken line of “Japan” starts out from an independent position, then touches the Western trajectory of linear progress (the solid line), resulting in a period of cultural conflict and merger, and finally convergence with the dominant line, which defines the “end of history.”
The second version (diagram B) views national histories as the primary narratives, represented by three broken lines. In this perspective, Western history is seen as a dominant narrative only during specific historical periods marked by conflicts and tensions, such as colonialism and imperialism (one solid line at the centre, two broken converging lines). After this period, national histories continue on separate trajectories, but they are influenced by certain universal features of Western history, which are primarily disseminated through global capitalism, such as advancements in technology. This corresponds to Eisenstadt’s celebrated notion of “multiple modernities.”
The third perspective (diagram C) proposes a similar evolutionary trajectory but suggests that, after the period of conflict and tension, one local line takes on the role of Western universalism, effectively substituting the Western line with its own alternative. In this scenario, the transition to planetary history is crucial, as it implies the end of human history and potentially the end of Western history, particularly in terms of the universality of capitalism. In other words, does the transition to planetary history imply that the Anthropocene will lead to a transformation of capitalism within the framework of global liberal democracy? Or does it necessarily entail a shift from one dominant trajectory to another, given that the concept of global liberal democracy may be an unattainable utopia? The latter perspective arises from the understanding that it is impossible to reach a political consensus among a large number of independent liberal democracies regarding the necessary transition to a post-capitalist society.
To be precise, this analysis does not imply the demise of liberal democracy, but it raises the open question of what the necessary transformation of capitalism means for the conventional conception of liberal democracy. At this point, Fukuyama reemerges as he confronts his Hegelian viewpoint with the Anglo-American traditions of liberal thought rooted in Locke, which share an anthropological conception of human beings with capitalism—emphasizing individualism, rationality, and self-interest. If liberal democracy cannot go global, is there an alternative?
The third scenario places China in the spotlight. What if we consider China’s historical trajectory as a replacement for the Western trajectory (diagram C)? The main argument is that China is unique in global history as the only political entity that has persisted for millennia, despite experiencing periods of fragmentation and a recent political revolution. In this regard, China embodies not the notion of universal progress, but rather a long-term stability accompanied by flourishing cultural creativity and diversity, similar to the scenario depicted by Japanese scholars regarding pre-capitalist Japan. Unlike Japan, however, China has a rich intellectual and cultural history that revolves around the concept of “Tianxia,” or “All Under Heaven,” which simply means “World.” It is important to note that Japanese cultural development was significantly influenced by China.
The concept of Tianxia has garnered attention from an international audience through the translations of Zhao Tingyang’s works, which contrast Chinese ideas of the body politic with Western concepts, particularly human rights and liberal democracy, as described by Fukuyama. At its core, Tianxia conceptualises the “world” as transcending national political communities; it serves as an abstraction of the political conditions of pre-imperial China. Tianxia suggests that there exists a cultural and moral center that does not impose hegemony over other communities but rather attracts them into its sphere through exchange and mutual benefit. In essence, Tianxia represents a cosmopolitan order to which people subscribe voluntarily, without Hobbesian concentration of physical powers.
The concept of Confucian cosmopolitanism, along with the rethinking of democracy, was already thoroughly developed in various contributions aimed at reforming the Empire in the late 19th and early 20th century. This became accessible to a Western audience through Chen Huanzhang’s book, “The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School,” published in the same year as the Empire’s fall. This work, which originated as a voluminous PhD thesis at Columbia University by the then secretary of the Imperial Grand Secretariat, is clearly a political program (luminaries such as Keynes took notice). It holds immense value for understanding the potential of envisioning alternative trajectories in global history. Chen emphasises both aspects of cosmopolitanism and the importance of well-being, highlighting the this-worldliness of Confucianism. However, he later founded the Confucian Church in Hong Kong (“Confucian Academy”), which remains active to this day, aiming to put Confucianism on par with the Western tradition of Christianity.
As I outlined in another post on this blog, late imperial economic thinking can be viewed as compatible with the challenges of overcoming the growth imperatives of capitalism. The concept of Tianxia directly invokes a planetary perspective, emphasising the interconnectedness of the entire world. Confucianism offers a rich universe of ideas that establish certain parameters, particularly the importance of ritual. Ritual can be understood as a universal practice of mutual recognition, thus unexpectedly building a bridge to Fukuyama’s views on thymos. At the same time, we can expand the notion of well-being to include the flourishing of Tianxia, which encompasses the totality of all beings on planet Earth.
Of course, these are just some fragments of inspiration. I urge us to take Confucianism seriously as an intellectual and spiritual framework for planetary thinking in the Anthropocene. This necessitates rewriting global history to contrast two alternative trajectories: the Western trajectory of universal progress and a Chinese trajectory that still requires elaboration and debate. To date, Chinese intellectual history has not received the same level of attention as Western history, except within specialist circles. A notorious example of this is the history of economic thought, which is still predominantly framed within an exclusive Western narrative—just visit Wikipedia (keeping in mind that the entry declares not to provide a global perspective). In fact, central economic ideas, such as the quantity theory of money and theories of price movements, originated in China long before modern times. It’s no wonder that the early European Enlightenment regarded China as the most advanced culture in the world and eagerly absorbed ideas and knowledge through Jesuit reports. It is time for us to move past contemporary political divisions and engage in a genuine dialogue based on mutual recognition.
The current discourse between China and the so-called “West” is centered on the debate between liberal democracy and authoritarianism, similar to the Western reception of Zhao Tingyang. The pressing question is whether this impasse can be resolved as we move beyond the notion of the “end of history” towards a more global perspective. The looming environmental crisis has prompted discussions of a “climate Leviathan” among Western intellectual circles. Confucian thought merges cosmopolitanism with an alternative understanding of authority, legitimacy, and political inclusion, concepts that were already detailed in Chen Huanzhang’s book. One of the most influential Confucian thinkers of the early 20th century, Liang Shuming, envisioned the “Sinicisation of the world.” This was meant as an alternative form of universalism (against the backdrop of the Western catastrophe of World War I). We should never forget that the Chinese (like most other people in the world) experienced Western so-called “universalism” as thoroughly exclusive, oppressive, and demeaning. Contra Fukuyama, the issue of group recognition is highly significant in promoting universalism. The outcome of the struggle for recognition can be the Confucian Anthropocene as an alternative universalism. Why not?
This post has been published under the auspices of the “Center for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences / Kolleg-Forschungsgruppe (KFG): Universalism and Particularism in European Contemporary History”, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – 449772505“.
The technosphere, our agency, our planet 